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Magnus Ryner (London)
Swedish Employment Policy
after EU-Membership
Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass die Koordinierte Strategie nationaler Beschäftigungspolitiken in
der EU trotz ihres pragmatischen neo-liberalen Charakters Schweden nicht hindert, seine traditionelle
selektive Arbeitsmarktpolitik fortzusetzen. Andere Aspekte der europäischen Integration, und hier
insbesondere die makroökonomische Konvergenz im Rahmen der Europäischen Währungsunion, haben
sich allerdings deutlich auf die schwedische Beschäftigungspolitik ausgewirkt. Es ist zu dramatischen
Veränderungen des schwedischen post-industriellen Wachstumspfades sowie des wohlfahrtsstaatlichen
Regimes gekommen. Allerdings bleiben wichtige Elemente des alten schwedischen Modells erhalten,
und dieser Artikel schließt mit einer Vorschau über seine Überlebenschancen in der Zukunft.
But, although the Swedish government would
like to have us believe that this is the case (Swed-
ish Ministry of Labour 1990; 1995), such a read-
ing of the situation fails to acknowledge that
the issue does not primarily hinge on employ-
ment policy in isolation from other measures
such as macroeconomic and social policy.
Rather, the issue hinges on the configuration of
the broader welfare policy régime, which indeed
is composed by an ensemble of such measures.
When such a broader perspective is taken into
account, it is clear that the CSNEP reflects the
continued preponderance of an “embedded neo-
liberalism” (pace van Apeldoorn 1998) or ordo-
liberalism in the European Union. The afore-
mentioned documents state, in no uncertain
terms, that employment policy is subordinated
to the exigencies and discipline of the world
markets via the EMU and the Stability and
Growth Pact (European Commission 1997a, 3;
1997b, 1–3; European Council 1997, 2). More-
over, according to these documents, “all poten-
tials” to employ the unemployed need to be
taken, and all “artificial barriers inhibiting job
creation” need to be removed (European Com-
mission 1997b, 8). The latter formulation is in
marked contrast to the social democratic idea
that labour power should only be made avail-
able when those who demand this commodity
1. Introduction
The Common Strategy for National Employ-
ment Policies (CSNEP) of the European Union
(EU) is a surveillance and benchmarking pro-
cess which emphasises supply-side ‘best prac-
tice’ measures to promote employability (Euro-
pean Council 1997, 1). For a superficial ob-
server, this might seem as an indication that there
is a process of social-democratisation of the
European Union. After all, in contrast to the
OECD’s ‘Jobs studies’, Commission documents
produced in the CSNEP-process seem at times
to engage in a polemic with mainstream eco-
nomic claims that the absence of market deter-
mined ‘flexibility’ is at the root of the employ-
ment problem. Instead, it emphasises the impor-
tance of measures more reminiscent of Scandi-
navian social democratic selective labour mar-
ket policy, especially vocational training and
retraining (compare inter alia European Com-
mission 1997b, 8–9 and OECD 1998a, 78–81).
The impression of a social-democratisation
might be reinforced by the fact that there is a
remarkable departure from passive measures,
characteristic of the Christian democratic main-
stream of the EU, such as early retirement and
the financing of long-term unemployed (Euro-
pean Commission 1997b, 7, 9).
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are able to guarantee certain uniform standards
compatible with social citizenship rights. In
other words, this emphasis on commodification
is in marked contrast to the social democratic
norms of decommodification (Esping-Andersen
1990).
Within this ordo-liberal framework, employ-
ment policy, along with a continued commit-
ment to negotiations between the ‘social part-
ners’ (European Commission 1997b, 10), is to
provide certain public goods that contribute to
the overall framework of market conforming
behaviour. The CSNEP represents an ordo-lib-
eralism in search of new solutions rendered nec-
essary as a result of the impasse of the Christian
democratic welfare state régime in the wake of
‘post-industrial’ mass-unemployment. Espe-
cially acute in this regard is the threat of a fiscal
crisis, resulting from a reduction of revenue (as
fewer people contribute to social insurance
schemes) and increased costs (as more and more
unemployed and early retirees make claims on
the insurance funds). Christian democratic wel-
fare policy régimes face a particular problem,
because they do not encourage sufficient growth
of service employment to absorb surplus labour
generated by increased capital intensity in the
manufacturing sector. Social wage costs are too
high to generate private service employment
growth, since the service sector cannot match
the productivity of the manufacturing sector, and
since there is an absence of public finance to
fund public service sector growth (Esping-
Andersen 1996).
Benchmarking and a discussion of best prac-
tices reflect a rather pragmatic approach within
which there is an openness to learn, both from
more the orthodox neo-liberal paradigm
(privatisation of services, numerical flexibility,
the need of an ‘enterprise culture’) as well as
from the social democratic paradigm (vocational
retraining) in order to tackle the problems posed
by unemployment. However, given its empha-
sis on privatisation and its commitment to re-
duce all obstacles to employment growth, the
CSNEP seems to find especially the ‘Dutch
Model’ as a source of inspiration in the search
for a way out of the impasse. This is a Christian
democratic régime, which has experienced a
relative neo-liberalisation, through increased
market-determined social wage segmentation,
and privatisation, which has been combined with
active labour market policy (Visser/Hemerijck
1997). Such measures, it is hoped, will gener-
ate labour-intensive, service-economy based
growth.
Nevertheless, the CSNEP is characterised by
heterogeneity. Apart from emphasising the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity and the absence of any for-
mal sanctions against those who diverge (this is
in notable contrast to the Growth and Stability
Pact), the documents are vague about the mix
of different elements of policy. This gives ample
space for the member states to interpret the
CSNEP in many ways. National policy mixes
may emphasise neo-liberal or social democratic
elements and this may open up spaces to main-
tain the distinct quality of national welfare policy
régimes. This article is concerned with the ex-
tent to which Sweden has attempted and man-
aged to maintain its distinct social democratic
welfare state response to ‘post-industrialism’
given the pressures of labour market and em-
ployment policy convergence that EU-gover-
nance may imply.
The argument of the article is that the CSNEP
as such does not provide an obstacle for the con-
tinuation of Swedish employment policy in a
narrow sense. Contrary to employment policy
in most EU member states, employability has
been emphasised in Sweden at least since the
mid-1950s when the government endorsed the
principles of the Rehn-Meidner model, with its
recommendation of selective labour market
policy. Indeed, there is very little evidence that
Swedish employment policy is abandoning this
type of policy, and with some justification,
Swedish policy makers consider themselves as
pioneers within this policy field. However, con-
sidering labour market regulation more broadly
as part of a welfare policy régime, European
integration has had a profound impact in Swe-
den. In particular, I argue that Swedish economic
policy makers have since 1985 pursued a policy
of macroeconomic convergence, first towards
the EMS and then to the EMU, by stealth. This
unleashed a process with its own logic, which
generated recommodification and welfare policy
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retrenchment in the late 1980s and the early
1990s. Employment policy – understood as se-
lective labour market policy – has, then, re-
mained relatively constant, but its purpose and
overall effect has altered, as it is part of a policy
ensemble with a very different form of capital
and currency market regulation, macroeconomic
policy stance, and social policy stance. This has
had an effect on unemployment levels and gen-
eral trade-offs between economic efficiency and
equality in Sweden.
Having established that Sweden, as a result
of EU-driven macroeconomic convergence, has
experienced welfare state retrenchment, the fi-
nal part of the article addresses two questions:
Is it possible, in the long run, to maintain selec-
tive labour market policy and the retrenched
welfare state within the present macroeconomic
framework, or can one expect a further thrust
of neo-liberalisation and commodification that
strikes at the very heart of the selective labour
market policy, labour law, and the principle of
collective bargaining? And, assuming that the
retrenchment process has been halted, do these
measures still make a difference in terms of in-
come distribution and social security?
2. European Integration, Social Democratic
Post-Industrialism and its Crisis in the 1990s
As Esping-Andersen (1990) has argued,
whereas the continental Christian democratic
welfare policy régimes have not been able to
increase employment in services, because of
high general wage rates that reflect the high pro-
ductivity of capital intensive manufacturing, and
have relied instead on work time reduction and
early retirement to maintain social cohesion, the
Swedish social democratic régime was more
successful in increasing employment through
the expansion of a public service sector in the
1970s and the 1980s. But contrary to the neo-
liberal response, typifying the American ‘jobs-
miracle’, where service employment with low
rates of productivity growth to a large extent
has been dependent on the creation of precari-
ous and low wage employment, Swedish and
social democratic post-industrialism has been
based on maintaining high social wages in the
economy as a whole. Keeping a commitment to
‘decommodification’ and continuing to draw on
the general prescriptions of the Rehn-Meidner
model (LO 1951; Hedborg/Meidner 1984;
Erixon 1994), this strategy has been based on
high taxes (including employers’ contributions),
solidaristic wage policy, and selective labour
market policy (especially vocational retraining
and sophisticated public employment ex-
changes). Here, some of the market-determined
surplus of the high productivity export oriented
manufacturing sector has been redistributed to
finance public and especially social service sec-
tor expansion. The service sector, which to a
large degree has absorbed the female workforce,
in turn, has served ‘reproductive functions’ for
economy and society as a whole (e.g. child care,
health care, prevention and rehabilitation of in-
juries), and generated user-producer networks
in a national system of innovation (e.g. retrain-
ing and spin-off effects between health care and
the pharmaceutical sector) (Edqvist/Lundvall
1993).
It was the Rehn-Meidner model that first pre-
scribed selective labour market policy. However,
it is rather coordinated and solidaristic wage
determination, which is at the centre of the
model, since it is primarily such policy that en-
sures that distribution- and legitimation-impera-
tives are made integral with imperatives of eco-
nomic efficiency and economic growth.
Solidaristic wage policy implies that collec-
tive bargaining is pursued according to the prin-
ciple that equal pay is given for equal work, ir-
respective of the marginal productivity of indi-
vidual enterprises. It served obvious distribu-
tive functions, together with tax-financed in-
come-maintenance social insurance schemes
with high replacement rates, such as unemploy-
ment insurance that were seen as necessary to
lower the latent threat that unemployment would
weaken union negotiating power. However,
solidaristic wage policy is also supposed to fa-
cilitate dynamic efficiency in the economy as a
whole through “transformation pressure”
(Erixon 1994). Enterprises that are not in the
position to pay the going rate are to be forced
out of business in order to free up resources for
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firms whose marginal productivity is above the
average and who in this system actually enjoy
rents as their labour costs are below what they
would be willing to pay. This promotion of pro-
ductivity growth, as well as stability in wage
growth, is also intended to have a dampening
effect on inflation at full employment. As the
service economy grew, the economic model for
coordinated bargaining had to change so as to
take into account the existence of a ‘sheltered’,
mainly public service, sector as well as an ‘ex-
posed’ export, mainly manufacturing, sector.
The principle of solidaristic wage policy was
here somewhat reformulated: growth in the ex-
posed export sector was to underwrite
solidaristic wages in the sheltered sector (e.g.
Edgren/Faxén/Odhner 1970; Faxén/Odhner/
Spånt 1987).
In order to fully appreciate the impact that
macroeconomic convergence with the EU had
for the Swedish welfare policy régime, it is im-
portant to appreciate that the solidaristic wage
policy of the Rehn-Meidner model required a
very specific supporting economic policy stance.
It was particularly important that profit rates of
corporations were contained while at the same
time adequate investments for the maintenance
of full employment were guaranteed. Too high
profit rates would mean that also some relatively
unproductive enterprises would remain in busi-
ness. This would create overheating tendencies
since high productivity enterprises would not
have an adequate labour supply. This, in turn,
would mean that these firms would offer wages
above the collective agreement. This is known
as ‘wage drift’, and it is very detrimental for
internal wage earner solidarity and trade union
legitimacy. Wage drift violates the “moral
economy” of the trade union collective, as mar-
ket forces upset the conception of ‘equal pay
for equal work’ (Swenson 1989). It also tends
to fuel inflation. This means that unions in low
productivity sectors are likely to use their
organisational clout to pursue compensatory
wage bargaining, which fuels inflation further
and which undermines real wage growth. How-
ever, the squeezing of profits results in an obvi-
ous danger that investment rates are insufficient
to sustain employment growth.
Given these potential conflicts of policy goals,
the Rehn-Meidner model set exceedingly high
demands on counter-cyclical fine-tuning that
had to be made compatible with constantly low
interest rates. Counter-cyclical policy was
needed to keep profit rates in check in upturns
in order to avoid wage-drift. At the same time,
interest rates were to be kept at a low level in
order to ensure adequate investments despite the
profits-squeeze. This balancing act required
capital and foreign currency controls and in-
creasingly led to calls for active selective in-
vestment policies through pension funds, wage
earner funds and renewal funds in a broader
national industrial policy (Pontusson 1992).
These measures were seen as essential, together
with the selective labour market policy of mo-
bility grants and retraining, prescribed in order
to increase the mobility of labour from low- to
high-productivity sectors. Such labour market
policy would ease the frictions in the structural
transformation-process engendered by
solidaristic wage policy and hence would and
did contribute immensely to the lowering of
unemployment below what could be achieved
by counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy alone
(see Hedborg/Meidner 1984, 72–85).
Selective labour market policy remains cen-
tral to Swedish employment policy and it is also
a source of inspiration in the search of ‘best prac-
tice’ in the CSNEP. However, the macroeco-
nomic policy stance of the Rehn-Meidner model
is not compatible with the norms of the EMU.
As a result, convergence pursued since 1985,
first towards the Single Market (especially for
financial services), the EMS, and then through
membership in the first two stages of the EMU,
has seriously undermined the labour market
regulation presupposed by the social democratic
welfare policy régime identified by Esping-
Andersen (1990). Such convergence was a cru-
cial factor behind the unemployment crisis in
Sweden in the early 1990s and it has played an
important role in making the labour market
structure more inegalitarian in the late 1990s.
In particular, the manner in which the EMS and
EMU have relied on discipline exerted by glo-
bal financial markets on exchange and interest
rates have undermined the institutional mecha-
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nisms of credit and macroeconomic policy that
mediated the contradictory imperatives of
counter-cyclical management and stable access
to credit at low interest rates. This has contrib-
uted to a breakdown of the ‘virtuous-circle’
between wage-coordination, investment and
employment at a time when this circle was be-
ing put at a severe test anyway as a result of an
intensified globalisation of financial markets,
transnationalisation of production of Swedish
multinationals, and related active efforts by
Swedish employers to abandon coordinated
bargaining (for an overview of these relation-
ships, see Ryner 1994).
The latter point might require some further
elaboration. In 1985, the Swedish government
deregulated the financial markets, amid massive
evasive swaps by transnational corporations and
other asset managers. Also, the Ministry of Fi-
nance introduced its so-called ‘borrowing-
norm’: It vowed not to borrow abroad in order
to cover Sweden’s balance of payments deficit.
Given the policy of maintaining the exchange
rate fixed, the latter was a deliberate measure
intended to ‘import’ discipline via international
pressures on the Swedish interest rate in order
to deter ‘irresponsible’ wage demands and pres-
sures on fiscal policy in the budget negotiations
process (Ryner 1999). The raison d’être was
very similar to that of the EMS, where interest
rate differentials vis-à-vis the German Mark
were used in order to internalise macroeconomic
discipline of member-states. Given the impor-
tance of the ‘Deutsche Mark zone’ for Sweden’s
international transactions, this was a huge step
towards European integration, taken rather se-
cretively by a narrow group of senior politicians
and technocrats in the Ministry of Finance and
the Central Bank.1 This policy stance was in
stark contradiction with the prescriptions of the
Rehn-Meidner model, where the interest rates
are supposed to be subordinated to the impera-
tives of wage determinations, not the other way
around.
The deregulation of the capital markets in
1985 and 1989 (as well as a tax reform) had
pro-cyclical effects in the late 1980s at the same
time as the borrowing norm increased the sen-
sitivity of the interest rate. Since deregulation
followed a radical devaluation of the Crown in
1982 that coincided with the ‘Reagan-boom’,
the initial effect was stimulatory. This led ex-
actly to the kind of process of wage drift, com-
pensatory wage bargaining and wage-push in-
flation which the Rehn-Meidner model warned
against, since especially public service employ-
ees tried to compensate themselves for price
increases and wage increases in the export sec-
tor (Ahlén 1989; Ryner 1994). Given the in-
creased sensitivity of the interest rates, the dis-
tributive conflicts were further accentuated and
the subsequent runs on the Crown became more
severe since there was a high exposure of the
Crown to operators on the short- term interna-
tional money markets (Ryner 1999).
Against this backdrop of overheating and
compensatory wage bargaining, speculations
against the Swedish Crown started, leading to
dramatic increases in interest rates. The auster-
ity measures that these engendered added mo-
mentum to the recession that commenced in the
beginning of 1991. Subsequently, Sweden ex-
perienced a number of years of negative growth
combined with fiscal crisis, caused by the ef-
fects of increases of claims on the unemploy-
ment insurance and social security funds. It
should also be pointed out that the major strains
on the budget came from interest payments, a
shortfall of revenue caused by an under-financed
tax reform and the bailout of bankrupt banks
that had overextended their loans in the upturn
of the business cycle. Interest rates were slow
to decrease, as the confidence in the Swedish
Crown was low. The Central Bank nevertheless
retained tight monetary policy in accordance
with EU stipulations as well as its own convic-
tions (on these developments, see OECD 1994,
11–24).
The change of the macroeconomic policy
stance that began in 1985 was a serious breach
of the Rehn-Meidner model in itself. But the
runs on the Swedish Crown also generated the
main impetus for cutbacks in social insurance
programmes. The dramatic increase of interest
rates and pressures on the value of the Crown
generated an atmosphere of crisis, which en-
abled politicians to take what otherwise would
have been considered inconceivable austerity
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measures. The so called ‘October Crisis’ of 1990
led to the epochal abandonment of full employ-
ment as the number one priority of economic
policy, as it was subordinated to price stability.
(And indeed, the intention to apply for EC mem-
bership was also announced at the same time.)
The spectacular run on the Crown of 1992 led
to unprecedented multi-partisan talks that
yielded a major ‘crisis package’ of cutbacks.
Finally, the aftermath of the ‘Peso Crisis’ of
1994 set in motion a process of budget consoli-
dations up to year 1997. Especially notable out-
comes of these austerity measures have been the
reductions of benefit levels, the introduction of
waiting days, and the tightening of eligibility
rules for income maintenance programmes such
as the health and unemployment insurance
programmes. In addition, employee-contribu-
tions have been introduced as a method of fi-
nance. In 1990, both health and unemployment
insurance had replacement rates of 90 per cent
of the income of the claimant and the entitle-
ment came into effect on the first day of sick-
ness/unemployment. By the end of that year, the
replacement rate for the three first days of sick-
ness was reduced to 65 per cent. In 1992, also
the benefit levels for the period after three days
were reduced (to 80 per cent for the first year
and 70 per cent thereafter) (Olsson 1993, 361).
Five waiting days were introduced for unem-
ployment insurance in 1993 at the same time as
employee contributions were increased so as to
save 600 million Swedish Crowns for the sys-
tem. The replacement ratio was also reduced at
this time to 80 per cent of the qualifying income
(Anderson 1998).2 These changes, along with
the abandonment of the full employment com-
mitment signify a major retreat from the prin-
ciple of decommodification in labour market
regulation.
The 1990s, then, were a period of profound
change, and this is reflected in key labour mar-
ket indicators. The severe recession resulted in
a dramatic increase of unemployment as com-
panies went out of business, or shed labour as a
result of corporate restructuring. In addition, the
public service sector shed labour as a result of
budget cutbacks (OECD 1994). Swedish unem-
ployment figures converged with the OECD-
total  (OECD 1997, Table 2.15) and although
the open unemployment rate remained 2 per cent
below the average for EU-15, Sweden became
but one average country in this high unemploy-
ment area. This is especially so, since the offi-
cial figures arguably hid a much worse devel-
opment. A large portion of the unemployed was
absorbed in temporary employment schemes
sponsored by the official Labour Market Board,
Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen (AMS). This is re-
flected in the statistics of standardised unem-
ployment rates, which counts some of those in
AMS-schemes as unemployed (Figure 1). At the
FIGURE 1: Comparative Unemployment Rates in Selected EU 15 Countries in 1990 and 1995
(Open Unemployment of Labour Force and Standardised Unemployment Rates)
per cent Open Unemployment/Labour Force Standardised Unemployment Rates
1990 1995 1990 1995
Sweden [1.7] Austria [5.9] Sweden [1.7] Austria [3.9]
Finland [3.2] NL [7.1] Finland [3.2] NL [6.9]
Austria [4.7] Sweden [7.7] Austria [n/a] Denm. [7.2]
UK [5.9] FRG [8.1] FRG [4.8] FRG [8.2]
NL [6.0] UK [8.6] NL [6.2] UK [8.7]
FRG [6.2] Denm. [10.2] UK [7.1] Sweden [8.8]
France [8.9] France [11.6] Denm. [7.7] France [11.7]
Italy [9.1] Italy [11.7] France [9.0] Italy [11.9]
Denm. [9.4] Finland [15.4] Italy [9.1] Finland [15.3]
Source: OECD (1999a), Annex Tables 21 and 22.
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same time, Sweden’s labour force participation,
while decreasing from 82.7 per cent in 1990,
remained comparatively high at 76.7 per cent
of the adult population. This is compared to 71.2
per cent in Germany, 67.5 per cent in Austria
and 61.7 per cent in the Netherlands. Only the
British participation rate came close to that of
Sweden, at 75.3 per cent (OECD, 1999a, Table
19).
Developments also point to centrifugal ten-
dencies in the wage determination process.
Wage determination has become increasingly
decentralised in Sweden. Whilst formally, col-
lective agreements always have been struck on
the sectoral level since the Saltsjöbaden Accord
of 1938, in practice bargaining has been coor-
dinated between branches through the coordi-
nation of demands within union confederations
and cartels and joint central bargaining. Such
coordination was severely weakened in the
1990s and de facto individual branches struck
their own accords, with some increased room
for local agreements. This is reflected in the
wage dispersal statistics that show a marked
change. Whereas Sweden experienced a trend
towards wage compression until the 1980s, the
present trend is one of wage dispersal (Figure
2).
It should be noted that these are statistics for
full time employees. When one considers the
fact that unemployment and involuntary part-
time work (underemployment) has increased,
together with the cutbacks of transfer payments,
the trend towards inequality is even more pro-
nounced (e.g. Statistics Sweden 1998; 1999).
One striking indicator of the change, with pro-
found impacts for the nature of the welfare
policy régime, is the fact that the number of
families that are dependent on means-tested so-
cial security payments more than doubled in the
1990s. The primary cause for this is unemploy-
ment, without entitlement to unemployment in-
surance (Mossler/Torége/Öström 1999). Finally,
there is strong evidence that the conditions at
work are changing for the worse in the 1990s,
due to the introduction of lean production
(Eklund 1999), which departs from the
codetermined experiments of post-Taylorist
technological change of the 1980s (Sandberg et
al. 1992).
FIGURE 2: Wage-Dispersal (P90/P10 Ratios of Wage Income for Individuals Employed Full Time)
Source: Own Calculations based on Statistics Sweden (2000).
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3. Swedish Employment Policy: Quo Vadis?
The previous section has accounted for the
relationship between European integration,
employment policy, and welfare state retrench-
ment in Sweden. This raises the following re-
lated question: What remains of the social demo-
cratic welfare policy régime? Do the remains
make a difference? And, has the process of re-
trenchment now run its course or will it con-
tinue? In this section, I argue that Sweden’s
forthcoming National Action Plan for the
CSNEP, and domestic deliberations that sur-
round it, suggest that the government is broadly
committed to the present configuration of em-
ployment policy, labour market regulation and
welfare policy régime, although a few further
administrative-disciplinary measures are likely
to be implemented. In this context, Sweden is
still a comparatively egalitarian society. Never-
theless, this is not to say that a new institutional
equilibrium has been reached. The conclusion
will be devoted to that question.
Following the Luxembourg Jobs Summit,
Sweden presented a National Action Plan
(NAP) for Employment to the EU in the spring
of 1998, which restated the aims and means of
the Employment Bill presented to the Riksdag
in 1996 (OECD 1999b, 71–72). Since this bill
was adopted, there have been further develop-
ments that have resulted in two new Govern-
ment Bills being presented to the Riksdag that
concern employment policy and the regulation
of the labour market. These have been prepared
by the new ‘super-Ministry’ of Economics
(Näringsdepartementet), which was created
through the merger of the former Ministries of
Labour and Industry. The first of the bills in
question aimed at reforming the wage determi-
nation system and it was presented in Decem-
ber 1999 (Swedish Ministry of Economics
1999b). It has been followed as recently as in
March this year with a new Employment Bill
(Swedish Ministry of Economics 2000a). They
will be followed by a third Bill aimed at reform-
ing the unemployment insurance system (not yet
available at the time of publication of this ar-
ticle) (ibid.). Together, these bills form the ba-
sis for the Swedish NAP presented to the EU
on May 1 this year. To highlight the develop-
ments I also juxtapose the present policy stance
with previous stances in the development of the
social democratic welfare régime.
Whilst in macroeconomic policy Sweden con-
forms firmly to disciplinary neo-liberalism, in
the areas of labour market policy, labour law,
collective bargaining and unemployment the
policy stance continues to be more consistent
with the social democratic welfare policy
régime. This is in many respects not surprising.
Even if the government wanted to deregulate
labour markets, they would have to face excep-
tionally strong trade unions that continue to rep-
resent 80 per cent of the labour force. This is at
present an inescapable fact of the political
economy of employment and labour markets in
Sweden. This is in itself a strong incentive for
finding negotiated and administrative solutions
in order to maintain stability and order – trade
unions must be compelled to take ‘social respon-
sibility’ and in order to enable them to do so,
they need to be able to show their members that
they receive something in return. Up until now,
contrary to the state of affairs in macroeconom-
ics, political movement towards an outright
abandonment of the principle of decom-
modification on the labour market has been very
limited. In the area of direct labour market regu-
lation, organised labour enjoys a more transpar-
ent and thus higher degree of representation. In
contrast to the Central Bank, insulated as it is
from direct influence of social actors, trade
unions have representation on the Board of Di-
rectors of AMS, which also has been shaped by
trade-union organisational culture (Rothstein
1986). In addition, AMS can claim that its tra-
ditional policy has been one of comparative suc-
cess. For example, the fact that Sweden has had
the most favourable trade-off in the OECD be-
tween employment and the filling of vacancies
(the Beveridge curve) since the 1960s to the
present weighs heavily against any argument of
a radical change in a neo-liberal direction (e.g.
AMS 1993; Edin/Holmlund 1994). It should
also be noted that in this area, neo-liberals do
not enjoy the same dominance in authoritative
knowledge-production as they do in macroeco-
nomics, with many institutes such as the Na-
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tional Institute of Working Life Research being
primarily informed by work in sociology and
institutionalist economics (which, however, has
lost its influence in macroeconomics since
Gunnar Myrdal’s times).
The elements of continuity can be well illus-
trated by pinpointing the criticisms that are
launched against Swedish employment policy
from the vantage point of the OECD Jobs Strat-
egy, and by juxtaposing these with the position
of the Swedish government. While commend-
ing Sweden’s continued commitment to voca-
tional retraining and education, the OECD ar-
gues that the labour market continues to be be-
set by ‘disincentive effects’. In particular, the
OECD points at the need to increase wage flex-
ibility with respect to skills, sectors and firms,
and to the need to review employment protec-
tion legislation to reduce hiring and firing costs.
Also, the OECD is critical to the Swedish un-
employment insurance (UI), which allows par-
ticipation in active labour market policy retrain-
ing schemes to count towards entitlement to UI,
and which does not have an upper limit of dura-
tion for eligibility of entitlements (OECD 1998a,
78–81).
The topic of UI was addressed in an agenda
setting document, published by the new Minis-
try of Economics (Swedish Ministry of Econom-
ics 1999a, Part 9.10). While acknowledging the
UI should be supply-side oriented, it was here
also asserted that the unemployed should feel
sufficient economic security in order not to be
in a position of subordination to the employer.
Further, contradicting the premises of the
OECD, the Ministry of Economics argued that
there is a weak correlation between the inten-
sity of search of the unemployed and her/his
chance to get a job. (The premise behind the
need for an upper limit of duration of UI is that
this increases search-intensity). Factors that are
far more important are the actual availability of
jobs, inadequate qualifications, age, being im-
migrant or disabled. Another outstanding fac-
tor, according to the Ministry, is the lack of
mobility due to family constraints (partners be-
ing offered jobs in different areas). While ac-
cepting that overall job-search intensity in-
creases as the unemployed approach the end of
an entitlement period, the Ministry argued that
studies yielding these conclusions are conducted
at a level too aggregate to be meaningful. In
contrast, the Ministry cites a study from the
Department of Sociology at Umeå University
(known for its left-wing orientation) on work-
motivation, search behaviour and job-chances
of 3500 unemployed. This study indicates that
what shows up in macro-studies is caused but
by a small minority of claimants, and legisla-
tion aimed against them would unduly increase
the insecurity of the vast majority who “hated
to be unemployed” (83 per cent) and who con-
sidered it “very important” to have a job.3
On questions of wage flexibility, the Minis-
try states that this is a matter for the negotiating
parties on the labour market. Although the Min-
istry considers wage formation to be an area of
concern that requires further public regulation,
such regulation is to be pitched at a macro-level,
helping to contain macro-wage increases (i.e.
not relative wage levels) through a strengthened
state mediation institute (Swedish Ministry of
Economics 1999a, Part 9.11). With regards to
employment protection legislation, the Minis-
try points out that it is based on dispositive regu-
lation and hence, can be changed through col-
lective agreement in order to adjust hiring and
firing costs. Therefore, there is no reason to
change a law that gives workers a measure of
influence over the organisation of work. How-
ever, the exception is for small enterprises where
the Ministry is likely to create exemptions in
the future. On the other hand, the Ministry is
considering increased employment protection
for pregnant women and parents of small chil-
dren (ibid., Part 9.12).
Present selective and active labour market
policies still follow the principles of interven-
tionist supply-side economics qua the Rehn-
Meidner model and attempt to develop them to
fit a more knowledge intensive production struc-
ture. The pillars remain public exchanges me-
diating labour supply and demand and labour
market retraining and re-education (Swedish
Ministry of Economics 2000a, 34–35). In fact,
in this respect, present policy returns to the
Rehn-Meidner principles after the deep reces-
sion of the 1990s. During the recession, active
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labour market policy was overloaded by the
sheer scale of claimants, which meant that the
cost for each individual unemployed had to be
kept down. This resulted in lower quality mea-
sures, where the priority was to keep the claim-
ant employed; there were not sufficient funds
and attention to individual needs and potential
to ensure that each claimant was given the maxi-
mum opportunity to increase employability in
high value added employment. The ambition in
the present upturn of labour demand is to gear
the policy towards fewer but high-quality re-
training measures with better prospects to yield
permanent employment and to downscale sub-
sidies intended to merely keep people in tem-
porary employment (ibid., 39–42). A new ini-
tiative takes place within the framework of ob-
jectives 1 and 3 of the EU Social Fund, which
aim to invest proactively in the development of
skills of the presently employed (ibid., 41). In
addition to this, the government proposes to
implement an ‘activity guarantee’ for long-term
unemployed, also to those who are no longer
job-seekers but on social security. These are to
be given supervised retraining in groups of 10
to 15 or rehabilitation organised on regional
‘transition labour markets’, which are to be regu-
lated by municipalities (ibid., 53–59) and offer
work that would not be available on the open
labour market. The local labour market boards
will act as a combined rehabilitation centre and
temp-work agency. The hope is that in a con-
text of increased labour demand also these
groups may be able to successfully join the regu-
lar labour market. In line with the EU commit-
ment to youth employment, all youths between
20 and 25 are offered a placement within 90
days of application at the labour market ex-
change.
These important continuities and develop-
ments along the basic principles of the Swedish
Model notwithstanding, there is a stronger dis-
ciplinary edge directed against labour in recent
labour market policy. In the balance between
social protection (decommodification) and the
disciplinary compulsion of ensuring the supply
of labour power (commodification), there is a
definite tilt towards the latter. One must reserve
judgement on the ‘activity guarantee’ and await
its implementation. But there is a clear danger
that the aim to better channel people into work
will lead to conditionalities in the provision of
social security, increased social control by the
state over the individual, and an attenuation of
social citizen entitlements.
More striking is the sharpening on the lan-
guage of UI in the new bill. While the bill does
not adopt OECD recommendations, it now con-
tains much clearer language on the conditional-
ity for UI entitlement. Whereas the paragraph
9.4 of the previous law of 1997 states that in-
ability to get appropriate work leads to UI en-
titlement, the new bill suggests an amendment
to read that only those who make an effort to
find appropriate work but cannot find it are en-
titled to benefits. The government presents this
as a clarification of existing regulations, but it
seems to create a rather large space of discre-
tionary power for the state in the interpretation
of ‘effort’. Moreover, an amendment in para-
graph 11 reads that “the government or author-
ity appointed by the government may determine
additional directives about the determination of
‘appropriate work’” (ibid., 9). In addition, it
should be pointed out that the rules for initial
eligibility to UI were tightened already in 1996:
Since then, only those who have been ‘regu-
larly employed’ are entitled to UI in the first
place and those who decline a job-offer are
penalised with longer periods without compen-
sation. No doubt, this has contributed to the in-
crease of claims for means-tested social secu-
rity benefits, as mentioned in the previous sec-
tion.
These changes have clearly attenuated the
degree of decommodification in employment
policy. Another set of departures from the Swed-
ish Model and the dense network of regulations
intended to ensure decommodification outcomes
concern the disintegration of linkages between
labour market policy, wage determination and
solidaristic wage policy. Especially the blue-
collar trade union confederation, LO (Lands-
organisationen i Sverige), had been preoccupied
with finding arrangements that would relieve
tensions between the danger of wage drift
caused by excessive profit rates, and low em-
ployment growth caused by inadequate invest-
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ments and profits. As mentioned above, LO
consistently sought ways to increase the mar-
ginal propensity to invest in relation to profit,
and to achieve control over profits so that they
would not cause wage drift and higher dividends
rates but be channelled into productive employ-
ment supporting investments. This explains the
importance of capital controls that held interest
rates low. The last initiative that was taken in
this vein was the introduction of the so called
‘renewal funds’ of the early 1980s. These were
formed as part of a quid pro quo for wage re-
straint after the devaluation of 1982. Renewal
funds were mandatory investments that corpo-
rations had to make in a special government
fund, when a certain rate of (excess) profit had
been reached. Companies could then apply to
use these funds for workplace innovations and
expansion, whose shape would be worked out
by employers and unions. Notably, the unions
had a veto over the usage of the funds and they
could use this veto to enforce their right to
codetermination. In case of the approval, AMS
retraining programmes, often customs-designed
for the investment in question, would be at dis-
posal for employers and workers in the retrain-
ing and restructuring effort (Eriksson/Nilsson/
Ohlsson 1991). The Uddevalla Plant of Volvo,
known for its innovative experiments in post-
Fordist production techniques, is perhaps the
most famous example of a major investment
project, which was funded through the renewal
funds. After the capital market deregulation,
initiated in 1985, this kind of policy, explicitly
linking labour market policy, wage policy and
investment policy, was discontinued. As a re-
sult of this, potential policy conflicts between
the imperatives of solidaristic wage policy and
employment promotion might be increasingly
difficult to mitigate. There is a tendency to rely
on higher profit rates and leave the unions to
cope with the difficulties of maintaining
solidaristic wage policy. This, however, amounts
to undermining any institutional link between
economic policy and wage bargaining. The
likely result is that trade unions, in the context
of 80 per cent density, displace the adjustment
through waves of compensation bargaining
when the economy approaches full employment.
This is likely to lead to the kind of inflationary
spiral that Sweden experienced in the late 1980s.
The risk that such a situation would re-emerge
when labour demand tightens is not lost on the
government. It is in this context that one must
consider the recent bill on wage determination
(Swedish Ministry of Economics 2000a), which
proposes the creation of a State Mediation Au-
thority and a tightening of procedures regard-
ing strikes and lockouts. On the problem of wage
formation, then, the Swedish government is not
moving towards a decentralisation of wages, but
rather embraces a more tripartite form of macro-
corporatism. Interestingly, this is now supported
by the LO (LO 2000), which now definitely has
given up on ways to regulate profits and accepts
this curtailment of its own freedom of associa-
tion as a second best option. The white-collar
workers confederations (TCO and SACO) as
well as the employers’ association (SAF), on
the other hand, are against the legislation and
would prefer a more market oriented numerical
flexibility in wage determination (TCO/SACO
1999; SAF 1998).
4. Conclusion
This article has argued that European integra-
tion has contributed decisively to a transforma-
tion of labour market regulation in the Swedish
welfare policy régime. Nevertheless, distinct
elements of employment policy remain. Rather
than summarising the argument behind this con-
tention, I would like to conclude by consider-
ing the two last questions raised in the last sec-
tion: Does this distinct policy still make a dif-
ference? And, has a new institutional equilib-
rium been achieved?
One crucial indicator that the remains of the
‘Swedish Model’ still make a difference is the
fact that, the increased inequalities notwithstand-
ing, Sweden remains the most egalitarian soci-
ety of the OECD (Figure 3). Furthermore, in
recent years, unemployment rates have actually
decreased towards 5 per cent this year (OECD
1999a, Table 21; Statistics Sweden 2000). This
means that Sweden has managed to prevent the
development of a strata of long-term unem-
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ployed, who lost complete contact with work-
ing life, which is a problem in many other EU-
states. No doubt, active labour market policy
has played an important role here. It is also en-
couraging that this decrease of unemployment
has not been accompanied with inflation and that
the upturn is accompanied with sustained pro-
ductivity growth rates not seen in Sweden since
the early 1970s and with real wage increases
(inter alia OECD 1999a, Table 14 and 1999b;
cf. OECD 1998b and Englander/Gurney 1994).
This does not contradict the contention made
earlier that there has been a recommodification
of labour market regulation and a shift in the
welfare policy régime. It does, however, put
these changes in context.
The positive economic indicators themselves
speak for the case of a new institutional equi-
librium. Given the growth rates and the lower
unemployment, there seems to be little need for
further retrenchment and indeed none is
planned.
Nevertheless, the future is not quite that cer-
tain. The main challenge in the years ahead, as
labour demand tightens, is indeed likely to be
in the areas of employment policy and wage
determination. The first question to consider is
if active labour market policy will be sufficiently
effective to prevent the development of bottle-
necks on the labour market. The other question
concerns the wage negotiation round due in
2001. Since the late 1980s, wage determination
in Sweden takes place on a sectoral level with
little coordination from the confederations at the
centre. It is possible that conflicts will emerge
between expanding high productivity sectors,
whose unions can demand more, and low pro-
ductivity sectors (such as public services) who
would use organisational power and moral
claims of solidarity to receive the same wage
increases for similar work done. In a positive
scenario, increased competition will keep profit
rates sufficiently low to pre-empt wage drift. But
in this case, the problem might be labour shed-
ding in previous monopoly sectors in the do-
mestic sector, which raises questions about how
their unions will react and whether active labour
market policy still can effectively channel the
unemployed labour in these sectors into expand-
ing sectors. In any case, the new State Media-
FIGURE 3: Comparative Indicators of Inequality (Percentage of Individuals in Households
with less than 50 per cent of median disposable income)4
Source: Jansson (2000) cf. Luxembourg Income Study and his own calculations, p. 8.
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tion Institute is likely to be subjected to severe
tests, as is union legitimacy and membership
support.5
It also remains to be seen if the economic re-
covery is sustainable. One weakness of the
Swedish economy in recent years has been its
dependence of the fortunes of a handful of
transnational corporations (TNCs). The export
sector has always been the engine of Swedish
growth; with exports making up 46 per cent of
GDP this is more the case than ever. But a new
and disconcerting fact is that the commitment
of Swedish TNCs to investments in Sweden is
becoming rather tenuous. These corporations
have become increasingly interested in invest-
ing in European core markets in order to ensure
customer proximity. One crucial question that
remains unanswered at the time of publication
is the extent to which present growth breaks with
this development. If the trend continues, pro-
ductivity growth is likely to be stifled, which
will further exacerbate conditions for wage ne-
gotiations and may lead to another cycle of dis-
tributive conflicts and possibly further retrench-
ment. If we witness a break with the previous
pattern, then one might wonder about the ef-
fects on long-term employment in the new types
of sectors and enterprises. Are these develop-
ments compatible with the distributive mecha-
nisms of the retrenched Swedish model of the
late 1990s?
2 The developments of unemployment insurance re-
trenchment are actually more complex than what this
summary suggests. Benefit levels were actually re-
duced to 75 per cent January 1, 1996, but amid union
protests and debates at the Party Congress of the
Social Democratic Party, the benefit levels were re-
stored at the 1993 levels of 80 per cent. Furthermore,
the employee contributions to the finance of UI have
been transferred to help fund the health insurance
system. The non-Socialist government of 1993 also
introduced a time-limit after which it no longer would
be possible to claim UI after participation in an ac-
tive labour market policy programme and they re-
moved the administration of UI away from the unions.
These latter measures were repealed by the Social
Democrats after 1994, but instead they have tight-
ened the eligibility criteria for UI.
3 Behind this formulation hides, of course, political
conflict on this topic, not only in the national politi-
cal arena but also within social democratic circles
(Anderson 1998). When the Social Democrats re-
turned to power in 1994, they restored the union ad-
ministration of the UI programme (the ‘Ghent
Model’). However, in the midst of continued fiscal
deficits, the SAP-government, under the leadership
of the Ministry of Finance, initially reduced benefit-
levels to 75 per cent and tightened the eligibility rules.
The waiting days and, very controversially, the time
limit on eligibility of UI benefits after participation
in AMS-measures were also originally to be retained.
But as a result of union mobilisation at the Social
Democratic congress, replacement rates were restored
to 80 per cent and the time limit of benefits were
repealed in 1996. In other words, the arguments in
the government document on this topic is an ex post
rationalisation of a retreat or perhaps a conversion to
the trade union view. This underlines the continued
influence of unions in this area of policy.
4 The seminal work of Panitch (1986) on the detrimen-
tal effects of corporatism on union membership sup-
port should be recalled in this context.
5 1994 for Canada and  Germany; 1995 for Norway,
Finland and the UK; 1997 for Sweden and the USA.
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